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I. INTRODUCTION
Do you think the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") should be able
to access the data on your iPhone? According to Apple's Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") Tim Cook, there's likely "more information about you on your phone
1
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than there is in your house."1 From step-tracking apps to banking and social
media accounts, a smartphone contains records of all one's calls, text messages,
contacts, calendar events and reminders, emails, photos, and internet browsing
history.2 Indeed, smartphones have transformed from audio call devices into
"digital repositories for the most intimate details of [one's] life."3 This is one of
the many reasons why Apple's refusal to create a new operating platform through
which the FBI can access a terrorist's encrypted iPhone is being hotly debated.4
The "FBiOS" could then be exploited to hack into anyone's iPhone.5 Every
iPhone user's data would be vulnerable.6
The Apple-FBI encryption debate may first appear to be purely domestic
in nature, but it has international implications. First, Apple is an international
business that sells the same model iPhones worldwide.7 So any "backdoor"8 it
creates would operate globally. Second, Apple has already faced demands from
other countries, like China, to decrypt iPhones on demand.9 Any concession by
I Chris Strohm, Your Smartphone Knows Who You Are and What You're Doing, BNA





4 For an overview of the litigation between the FBI and Apple, see The FBI vs. Apple, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2016, 10:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fbi-vs-apple- 1455840721.
5 Julia Angwin, What's Really at Stake in the Apple Encryption Debate, PROPUBLICA (Feb.
24, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/whats-really-at-stake-in-the-apple-
encryption-debate ("Apple says the FBiOS would 'be relentlessly attacked by hackers and
cybercriminals' hoping to obtain a copy of the golden key."); Brian Barrett, The Apple-FBI Fight
Isn't About Privacy vs. Security. Don't Be Misled, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2016/02/apple-fbi-privacy-security/ ("It would be great if we could make a
backdoor that only the FBI could walk through... [b]ut that doesn't exist. And literally every
single mathematician, cryptographer, and computer scientist who's looked at it has agreed.").
6 Barrett, supra note 5 ("[T]he way computer security works means that it has to be absolute.
Any precedent that says a company can be compelled to weaken its security will have injurious
consequences, full stop. There are no shades of grey, no matter what politicians and law
enforcement might suggest.").
7 See Benjamin Mayo, All iPhone 6s and iPhone 6s Plus Models Now Sold Out Worldwide
Ahead of Friday Launch, 9To5MAC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://9to5mac.com/2015/09/2 I/iphone-6s-
iphone-6s-plus-sold-out-worldwide/.
8 In this case, the "backdoor" the FBI is seeking is an override to the iOS feature in which all
local data on an encrypted iPhone is erased after ten incorrect passwords are entered on the device.
The FBI vs. Apple, supra note 4.
9 Danny Yadron et al., Inside the FBI's Encryption Battle with Apple, THE GUARDIAN (Feb.
18, 2016, 1:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/inside-the-fbis-
encryption-battle-with-apple ("[Apple CEO] Cook, who has managed threats from China to force
decryption of the iPhone, had taken unyielding stances against backdoors, both in the US and
overseas, where a host of foreign countries are debating... measures to give their security services
access to customer data from Apple and other firms.").
[Vol. 119
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Apple to similar U.S. demands threatens their ability to withstand those demands
internationally.'0 Finally, the decryption demand follows the recent demise of the
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor agreement hat governed trans-Atlantic data transfers for
the past 15 years." The Safe Harbor was invalidated precisely because the
arrangement permitted U.S. government and law enforcement agencies too much
freedom in accessing data transferred to U.S. companies. 12 Should Apple create
the backdoor that the FBI is demanding-capable of decrypting and providing
government access to any iPhone worldwide-then it will likely endanger any
hope either region has of reaching an agreement permitting trans-Atlantic data
transfers.
For the past 15 years, trans-Atlantic data transfers were conducted via a
Safe Harbor agreement between the United States and the EU. 13 The Safe Harbor
permitted data transfers to self-certified U.S. companies that provided privacy
protections equivalent to European law despite lower U.S. requirements,
essentially overriding an EU ban on data transfers to countries with lower data
protection.14 The resulting trans-Atlantic data transfers (which rank as the highest
10 Id.
11 The Safe Harbor was established in 2009 and was "the primary-and often sole-
mechanism under which more than 4,400 companies of all sizes, and across all industries, legally
transferred data from Europe to the United States for the past 15 years." After Safe Harbor: EU-
US Privacy Shield, INFO. TECH. INDUSTRY COUNCIL, http://www.itic.org/safeharbor (last visited
Oct. 3, 2016). The Safe Harbor was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the European Union
("CJEU") in October 2015. Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schechner, EU Court Says Data-Transfer
Pact With U.S. Violates Privacy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2015, 1:42 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-court-strikes-down-trans-atlantic-safe-harbor-data-transfer-pact-
1444121361. The Apple-FBI encryption debate became a publicly-debated issue during February
2016, just as EU authorities began considering a prospective replacement trans-Atlantic data
transfer agreement. The FBI vs. Apple, supra note 4; Stephen Gardner, Art. 29 Working Party
Cautious on Privacy Shield Deal, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.bna.com/art-29-
working-n57982066965/. That agreement is still dependent on U.S. authorities having only
limited, necessary, and proportionate data access. Gardner, supra. (emphasizing that the EU
regulatory authorities will need to evaluate the prospective deal for four essential guarantees,
including government access "governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality"). The
Apple-FBI debate threatens the credibility of U.S. claims that this essential guarantee will be
honored. See Stephanie Bodoni, Apple's-FBI Clash Risks Piercing EU-US Privacy Shield,
BLOOMBERG BNA ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (Mar. 8, 2016, 5:59 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-08/apple-s-clash-with-fbi-risks-piercing-trust-
in-eu-privacy-shield.
12 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
13 After Safe Harbor: EU-US Privacy Shield, supra note 11.
14 The EU prohibits data transfers to countries with protections below their strict requirements.
Ivana Kottasova, Europe's Big Data Bombshell: What You Need to Know, CNN MONEY (Oct. 6,
2015, 2:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/06/news/companies/safe-harbor-data-privacy-
europe/ ("Europe has strict rules to protect data, and doesn't allow it to be transferred to any country
that does not adhere to them."). Because the United States did not have a comprehensive data
privacy law that provided similar protections to that of the EU, the Safe Harbor framework was
2016]
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cross-border transfer rate worldwide) support an increasingly interdependent
trans-Atlantic digital economy.15 Seventy-five percent of all products traded and
delivered online are attributable to the combined digital economies of the United
States and the EU;16 they are each other's largest trading partners in digitally
deliverable services;7 and the services imported from one region are frequently
incorporated into the other's exports.18 But the Safe Harbor permitting these
trans-Atlantic data transfers was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the
European Union ("CJEU") in its Schrems v. Facebook'9 decision in October
2015, endangering the business practices of over 4,500 U.S. companies20 and
half a trillion dollars of trans-Atlantic trade and other digitally deliverable
services.21
While there are interim solutions that businesses can use in the absence
of the Safe Harbor framework, these are threatened by the United States'
negotiated to permit trans-Atlantic data transfers on the "basis that the transfers [were] done in
accordance with privacy principles similar to those contained in the EU Data Protection Directive
(95/46/EC)." Jabeen Bhatti, Commerce Official: U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Vital Because "Huge
Economic Interests at Stake ", BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L. RESOURCE CTR.
(May 12, 2015), http://www.bna.com/commerce-official-useu-nl7179926398/.
15 JOSHUA P. MELTZER, BROOKINGS INST., THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET AND
TRANSATLANTIC DATA FLOWS FOR U.S. AND EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT 4 (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/internet-transatlantic-data-flows-
version-2.pdf ("The most significant economic relationship for the U.S. and Europe is the one they
share; each is the other's largest markets for goods and services."); see also Remarks for TABC
Conference: Perspectives on the EU's Digital Single Market Strategy-The Transatlantic
Perspective, U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. MISSION TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION], http://useu.usmission.gov/text91715.html.
16 U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 15.
17 Id.
18 Id. ("53 percent of digitally deliverable services imported from the U.S. (including
consulting, engineering, design, and financial services) were used in the production of EU exports,
and 62 percent of digitally deliverable services imported from the EU were incorporated into U.S.
exports.").
19 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, 2015 ECLI 650,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid= 169195 &pagelndex=0&doclan
g=en&mode=lst&dir-&occ=first&part= l&cid=702383.
20 Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
21 Shannon Taylor, It's Clear the U.S. and EUEconomies Need a Safe Harbor 2.0, INFO. TECH.
INDUSTRY COUNCIL TECHWONK BLOG (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.itic.org/news-events/techwonk-
blog/its-clear-the-us-and-eu-economies-need-a-safe-harbor-20. The trans-Atlantic digital
economy has grown substantially, growing from billions to trillions of dollars in just the past three
years alone. See, e.g., MELTZER, supra note 15, at 1 ("In 2012, the U.S. exported $140.6 billion
worth of digitally deliverable services to the EU and imported $86.3 billion worth. U.S. exports of
digitally deliverable services to the EU comprise 72 percent of bilateral services exports, compared
with 55 percent of exports to Asia and Latin America.").
[Vol. 119
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willingness to use extraterritorial jurisdiction to access data stored overseas.22 To
sustain trans-Atlantic data transfers in the long-term, the United States and EU
must harmonize their data privacy frameworks. Right now, the sharp differences
between the regional frameworks produce a level of discord similar to the grating
sounds of a musical performance without harmony. This striking discord
between the United States and the EU was mitigated by the Safe Harbor
framework, but its recent demise removed that single harmonizing note and made
the regional discord worse.
Legal scholars have historically discarded proposals to harmonize U.S.
and EU data privacy regulation as impossible because of the large gap between
the frameworks and each region's deep commitment to their approach.23 But this
Note demonstrates that the idea of regional harmonization is much more feasible
than it was in the past, and it should no longer be discarded as an inviable option.
This Note argues that regional harmonization is now a much more
feasible long-term solution for four reasons: (1) the lack of a Safe Harbor
permitting trans-Atlantic data transfers creates an incentive that did not
previously exist, (2) the change in U.S. public opinion regarding data privacy
demonstrates an interest in changing its framework, (3) the regions share
economic and security imperatives that encourage harmonization, and (4) the
regions do not need mirror image frameworks to achieve harmonization.
This Note will demonstrate this thesis by first providing a high-level
overview of the differences between the U.S. and EU data privacy frameworks
and the current trans-Atlantic data transfer dilemma in Part II. Section II.A will
provide an overview of the differences between the regional data privacy
frameworks. Section II.B will discuss the Safe Harbor framework, its
invalidation by the CJEU in Schrems v. Facebook, and the interim solutions
businesses may use until the regulatory environment is clearly defined. Section
22 See discussion infra Part II.C. Extraterritoriality refers to the "applicability or exercise of a
sovereign's laws outside its territory." Extraterritoriality, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/extraterritoriality (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). For further
information on its scope and the various jurisdictional principles it may follow (including the
protective principle, universality principle, passive personality principle, and effects jurisdiction),
see MARK WESTON JANIS & JoHfN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 909-
25 (5th ed. 2014).
23 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United
States and European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 877, 881 (2014) (discarding the idea of regional
harmonization as a viable solution to the trans-Atlantic dilemma because "[a]ttempts to harmonize
U.S. and EU privacy law by turning EU privacy law into a U.S.-style approach, or vice versa, are
unlikely to succeed .... [as] [b]oth the United States and European Union are deeply committed to
their respective approaches"). Professor Daniel Solove is a particularly well respected legal scholar
in the area of privacy who has written more than 10 books and 50 articles in the area. See DANIEL
SOLOVE, https://www.danielsolove.com/bio/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). He even founded a
company called TeachPrivacy that focuses on privacy and data security training. Id. He currently
serves as the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law at the George Washington
University Law School. Id.
2016]
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II.C will discuss how these interim solutions are threatened by the potential
extraterritorial application of U.S. or EU law. Then, Part III will discuss the four
reasons why regional harmonization is a much more feasible long-term solution
than it was historically regarded.
First, the lack of a Safe Harbor permitting trans-Atlantic data transfers
creates an incentive to harmonize that did not previously exist; particularly
considering the weight businesses with trans-Atlantic data processes will place
on the cost-saving benefits of complying with a streamlined set of harmonized
regulations against the costly and duplicative processes required to be compliant
with two divergent regional frameworks.
Second, regional harmonization is much more feasible because changing
U.S. public opinion regarding data privacy is indicative of a willingness to revise
its framework. This willingness to change the current framework is visible in
three ways. One, there is a significant push for a more meaningful and nuanced
form of consent than the current "notice and consent" or "privacy self-
management" framework presents. Two, the growing dissatisfaction with the
current framework is evident in the class action lawsuit against Google for its
practice of data-mining all Gmail content. Three, there are numerous proposals
to update the framework, including proposals to improve privacy self-
management, regulate data use rather than data collection, and establish clear due
process requirements for digital transaction surveillance. Each of these
proposals, combined with the other two indicators of increasing discontent with
the current system, demonstrate the United States' growing willingness to revise
its current data privacy framework.
Third, the regions share economic and security imperatives that
encourage regional harmonization. Fourth, regional harmonization does not
require that the United States and the EU have frameworks that mirror each other
exactly. Part IV will conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand why regional harmonization should now be considered a
viable long-term solution, one must first understand why trans-Atlantic data
transfers are at risk. This part will provide a high-level overview of regional data
privacy differences in the United States and the EU and the current trans-Atlantic
data transfer dilemma. Section A will provide an overview of the differences
between the regional data privacy frameworks, while Section B will discuss the
Safe Harbor framework, its invalidation by the CJEU in Schrems v. Facebook,
and the interim solutions businesses may use until the regulatory environment is
clearly defined. Section C will discuss how the risk of extraterritorial jurisdiction
threatens these interim solutions.
[Vol. 119
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A. Regional Data Privacy Differences in the United States and the
European Union
The regional differences between data privacy frameworks in the United
States and the EU first became apparent when the EU passed the Data Protective
Directive in 1995, and has become more distinct over time.24 The best summary
of these differences is perhaps the six variances Professor Joanna Tourkochoriti
identified between data privacy regulation in the United States and the EU:
(1) Fundamental Presumptions: Personal data cannot be
processed in the EU without a legal basis, whereas it is
presumed permissible in the United States unless
limited by law.25 U.S. plaintiffs must prove an actual
harm to be successful, whereas EU plaintiffs do not.26
(2) Contractual Limits: EU citizens cannot contract their
privacy rights away, whereas U.S. law permits
individuals to do so via various user and licensing
agreements.27 This is true even if an EU citizen
unambiguously consents to such agreements.28
(3) Protective Coverage: U.S. law offers limited data
protections through a sector-by-sector regulatory
approach, whereas the EU has a comprehensive
framework that requires data protections to "be
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed" and that those
purposes are "specified, explicit and legitimate.,
29
(4) Weight of Conflicting Values: Privacy is a fundamental
right on par to freedom of expression in the EU; whereas
it is an interest that is often secondary to more explicit
constitutional rights, like freedom of speech, in the
United States.3°
(5) Definitions: In the EU, personal data includes any
information that is identifiable to a person (meaning the
24 MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, U.S.-EU DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO
PRIVACY SHIELD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 3 (2016).
25 oanna Tourkochoriti, The Snowden Revelations, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership and the Divide Between U.S.-EUin Data Privacy Protection, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 161, 164 (2014).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 164-65.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 166.
30 Id. at 167.
2016]
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data could be linked to a person even if it is not at the
moment), whereas personally identifiable information
in the United States is limited to data that is directly
linked to an individual.31
(6) Enforcement: Each member-state of the EU has an
independent authority dedicated to data protection,
empowered to investigate violations and also monitor
technology and business practices for data privacy
impacts to which the EU legal framework must respond;
whereas the United States has yet to establish a similarly
dedicated agency, although the Federal Trade
Commission has increased its role in data protection.32
As these six variants indicate, there are significant differences in the breadth,
scope, and depth of the data protections offered in the United States and the EU.
But it is common for there to be variations in the legal frameworks of different
countries; the trans-Atlantic data transfer dilemma is unique because it arose
when the EU prohibited transfers to countries that did not offer an equitable level
of protection, and the United States was found to offer insufficient data
protection.33
B. The Trans-Atlantic Data Transfer Dilemma
Personal data can only be transferred from the EU to a third country,
such as the United States, when that country's domestic law or international
commitments "ensure[] an adequate level of protection.,34 The United States was
one of many countries that did not provide sufficient legal protection for personal
data,35 so the EU collaborated with the United States to develop a "Safe Harbor"
framework through which data transfers would be permitted.36 That framework
31 Id. at 168. See generally Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 891-904 (discussing these
definitional differences in significant detail).
32 Tourkochoriti, supra note 25, at 168, 172.
33 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
34 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 117/15, The Court of Justice Declares
that the Comm'n's US Safe Harbour Decision is Invalid 1 (Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinafter CJEU
Declares Safe Harbor Invalid].
35 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third
Countries, EuR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/adequacy/indexen.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (recognizing only the following
countries as providing adequate protection: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands,
Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Uruguay).
36 US-EU Safe Harbor Under Pressure, IAPP PRIVACY TRACKER (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://iapp.org/news/a/us-eu-safe-harbor-under-pressure (noting that the Safe Harbor was
negotiated by U.S. and EU officials "who recognized the need for cross-border data transfers
[Vol. 119
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was formally approved in EU Commission Decision 2000/520/EC on July 26,
2000.37
1. The Safe Harbor Framework
The Safe Harbor permitted companies to exchange data internationally
by self-certifying that they met the privacy standards of the EU, even though they
were not required to meet those standards under U.S. regulations.38 The
representations of these self-certifying companies were to be validated, and the
parameters of the Safe Harbor enforced, by the Federal Trade Commission.3 9 The
program came under scrutiny after the Edward Snowden leaks revealed the
expansive U.S. surveillance system that encompassed EU citizens.4n
On November 27, 2013, the EU Commission sent a communication to
the United States regarding the "[f]unctioning of the Safe Harbo[]r from the
[p]erspective of EU [c]itizens and [c]ompanies [e]stablished in the EU. 4 1 In that
communication, the EU Commission expressed doubts about the enforcement of
the Safe Harbor requirements in the United States and mandated that the United
States adopt 13 recommendations to increase transparency.42 Examples of such
improvements included requiring public disclosure of the privacy policies of
self-certified companies (with links to the Department of Commerce's list of
current Safe Harbor members), public disclosure of privacy conditions within
subcontractor agreements, and public disclosure of all former Safe Harbor
participants with expired self-certifications on the Department of Commerce
website.43
The EU Commission also demanded greater enforcement by U.S.
agencies, including "ex officio investigations of effective [privacy policy]
compliance" of self-certified companies after initial or renewed certification,
follow-up investigations within one year of compliance violations, notification
to the relevant EU data protection authority whenever there is a complaint or
despite the EU's position that the United States does not provide adequate protection for the
personal data of EU data subjects").
37 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of July 26, 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department
of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
38 Bhatti, supra note 14.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established
in the EU, COM (2013) 0847 final (Nov. 17, 2013).
42 Id. at 18-19.
43 Id. at 18.
2016]
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investigation into a self-certified company, and mandatory investigations of false
Safe Harbor membership claims.4 Finally, the EU Commission demanded that
self-certified companies publish the extent to which U.S. authorities could collect
and process data transferred under the Safe Harbor and that any such collections
for national security purposes be limited to what is strictly necessary or
proportionate.45 The EU Commission emphasized that the Safe Harbor could be
suspended if these concerns were not addressed.
The communication was effective: U.S. enforcement agencies showed
increased interest in enforcing Safe Harbor certification requirements. The
Federal Trade Commission settled charges of Safe Harbor certification status
misrepresentations with 13 companies.46 But it also sparked fears that the Safe
Harbor could be suspended.47 One EU law student, Maximillian Schrems, even
filed a lawsuit against the data protection commissioner in Ireland challenging
the Safe Harbor Framework.48
2. The Safe Harbor is Invalidated in Schrems v. Facebook
Mr. Schrems's lawsuit began as a complaint with the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner, alleging that his personal data on Facebook was not
sufficiently protected under the Safe Harbor framework because Edward
44 Id. at 19.
45 Id. The European Court of Human Rights does not consider the term "necessary"
synonymous with "indispensable." ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, NECESSARY &
PROPORTIONATE: INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE 20 (2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf. Nor does it
consider it "as flexible as the terms 'admissible,' 'ordinary,' 'useful,' 'reasonable,' or 'desirable."'
Id. It is instead very similar to the principle of necessity and proportionality used by the UN Human
Rights Committee, which has held that:
it is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they
must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to
the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their
protective function; they must be the least intrusive instruments amongst those,
which might achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the
interest to be protected.
Id.
46 FTC Reaches Settlement with Thirteen Companies over Safe Harbor Misrepresentations,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS: PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Aug. 19, 2016),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/08/19/ftc-reaches-settlement-thirteen-companies-safe-
harbor-misrepresentations/.
47 Microsoft Warrant Challenge Could Alter U.S.-E. U. Data Pact, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
(June 8, 2015), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/microsoft-warrant-challenge-could-alter-
us-eu-data-pact-2015-06-08/.
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Snowden had revealed how easily intelligence services could access data
transferred to the United States under the Safe Harbor framework.4 9 The Data
Protection Commissioner rejected his complaint on the ground that the EU
Commission had already determined that the United States met the requisite
privacy standards when it approved the Safe Harbor framework in 2000.5o When
Mr. Schrems appealed to the High Court of Ireland, the High Court asked the
Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") whether the EU Commission's
decision prevented national supervisory authorities from independently
investigating whether a third country provides an adequate level of protection
per the Data Protection Directive and potentially suspending data transfers when
those standards are not met.51
On October 6, 2015, the CJEU held that national supervisory authorities
must be able to conduct such independent assessments and therefore declared the
Safe Harbor invalid. 2 First and foremost, the CJEU held that national
supervisory authorities "must be able to examine, with complete independence,
whether the transfer of a person's data to a third country complies with the
requirements laid down by the directive.53 While the national supervisory
authority cannot declare the EU Commission's decision invalid-this can only
be done by the CJEU-it must be able to conduct an independent investigation
and initiate domestic proceedings that may be referred to the CJEU for a final
decision.54
Second, the CJEU held that the Commission Decision authorizing the
Safe Harbor was invalid because U.S. public authorities were not bound by it.
55
It permitted "national security, public interest and law enforcement requirements
of the United States [to] prevail over the safe harbo[]r scheme, so that United
States [businesses] are bound to disregard, without limitation, the protective rules
laid down by that scheme where they conflict with such requirements.56 Because
the Safe Harbor framework did not include a strict necessity limit on government
access and it did not include legal remedies for individuals to "have access to
personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such
data," it did not meet the protective standards guaranteed by the Charter and Data
49 CJEU Declares Safe Harbor Invalid, supra note 34, at 1.
50 Id. (citing Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection
Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued
by the US Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L215) 7.).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 3.
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Protection Directive and therefore could not be validly decided by the
Commission.7
3. Interim Business Solutions
The CJEU's decision does not call for the immediate suspension of data
transfers conducted under the Safe Harbor, but it does give national regulators
the authority to investigate and suspend data transfers that do not meet the
protection standards established in the Charter and EU Privacy Directive.5 8 It
also creates significant legal risks for the 4,500 companies that have conducted
business under the Safe Harbor framework for the past 15 years, including Apple,
Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook9
The Article 29 Working Party, which the EU created to encourage
consistency amongst its 28 member-state privacy regulators,6 ° issued a public
statement following the CJEU's decision declaring "transfers that are still taking
place under the Safe Harbor decision after the CJEU judgment are unlawful. 61
It encouraged businesses to immediately review their data transfer mechanisms
and emphasized that any legal and technical solutions to the CJEU decision must
address the "necessary oversight of access by public authorities, on transparency,
57 Id. at 3.
58 Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
59 Id.
60 The Article 29 Working Party is an independent advisory body on data protection and
privacy created under Article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC. STATEMENT OF THE ARTICLE 29
WORKING PARTY 2 (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-
release/art29_press-material/2015/20151016_wp29_statement on schrems-judgement.pdf. It is
comprised of "representatives from the national data protection authorities of the EU Member
States, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Commission," and its tasks are
"described in Article 30 of Directive 95/46/EC and Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC." Id. It has
the authority to "examine any question covering the application of the data protection directives in
order to contribute to the uniform application of the directives" and "carries out this task by issuing
recommendations, opinions and working documents." Id. According to Article 30 of the Directive,
the Working Party shall:
(a) examine any question covering the application of the national measures
adopted under this Directive in order to contribute to the uniform application
of such measures; (b) give the Commission an opinion on the level of
protection in the Community and in third countries; (c) advise the Commission
on any proposed amendment of this Directive, on any additional or specific
measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of natural persons with regard
to the processing of personal data and on any other proposed Community
measures affecting such rights and freedoms; (d) give an opinion on codes of
conduct drawn up at Community level.
Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard To the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 48.
61 STATEMENT OF THE ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, supra note 60, at 2.
[Vol. 119
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/12
TRANS-A TLANTIC DATA REG ULA TION
on proportionality, on redress mechanisms and on data protection rights.,62 But
the Working Party also recognized the importance of having a "robust, collective
and common position on the implementation of the judgment" and stated that it
will give companies until January 2016 to find appropriate solutions for
complying with the CJEU judgment before regulators initiate enforcement
proceedings.
63
Although there is a possibility that the regions will be able to create
another Safe Harbor framework, it would need to receive approval from all 28
member-state regulators to be effective.64 In the meantime, there are some
alternative solutions that businesses may use.65 Of course, all of these solutions
require time and resources to implement. Large businesses like Amazon, Google,
and Facebook will likely be able to weather the storm, but there are many other
small and medium-sized businesses amongst the 4,500 impacted by the Safe
Harbor's invalidation that may not be so lucky.66 It is for this reason that the loss
of the trans-Atlantic agreement is considered a threat to the "world's largest
trading relationship" and the global economy.67
Some interim solutions to continue trans-Atlantic business operations
without the Safe Harbor include model contracts, binding corporate rules, and
dedicated data centers within the EU.68 Model contracts, which are also known
as standard contractual clauses ("SCC"), are template contractual clauses that
businesses can create and get pre-approved by EU officials for subsequent use.
69
Of course, businesses will need to invest time and money in first creating these
template clauses, soliciting pre-approval by the EU, and then re-papering
existing agreements so the model contract language covers current business.
Amazon's cloud-computing division has already received approval from the EU
for standard contracts.70 These model contracts will need to govern all data
transfers, even if the transfer is between entities within the same multinational
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Press Release IP/16/216, European Comm'n, EU Commission and United States Agree
on New Framework for Transatlantic Data Flows: EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 2016).
65 These include model contracts, binding corporate rules, and dedicated data centers within




69 See Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EUR.
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-
transfers/transfer/index-en.htm (last updated Feb. 12, 2015).
70 Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
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company, so a separate legal agreement with this standard contract language may
need to be created and signed for each individual data transfer.7'
An alternative to creating these standard contractual clauses and
incorporating them into separate legal agreements governing individual data
transfers is to create a single set of binding corporate rules ("BCR") that govern
all data transfers between entities within a multinational company. These are
internal rules that ensure adequate protection under the EU Privacy Directive,
regardless of whether or not the receiving entity within the multinational
corporation is located in a country that does not ensure adequate protection.72 To
be valid, the BCR must contain privacy principles like transparency, data quality,
and data security; implementation tools like periodic audits, employee training,
and a complaint handling system; and evidence that the BCRs are binding on all
entities within the multinational company.73 The Article 29 Working Party hinted
in its public statement after the CJEU decision that, even though companies can
continue to rely on these compliance mechanisms at the moment, it is possible
the effectiveness of these mechanisms will be re-evaluated as the Working Party
"continue[s] its analysis on the impact of the CJEU judgment on other transfer
tools.,
74
Other businesses, including Google, have elected to avoid the issue
entirely by establishing dedicated data centers within the EU. Google announced
that it is expanding its data center in Belgium and is building another one in the
Netherlands.75 This is in addition to the data centers it already has in Finland and
Ireland.76 However, this solution is unlikely to remain viable in the long-term
71 Model contracts may be used for internal or external data transfers between the United States
and the EU. After Safe Harbor: What To Do Next To Remain Compliant?, PIERSTONE,
http://pierstone.com/after-safe-harbor-what-to-do-next-to-remain-compliant-october-2 15/ (last
visited Nov. 1, 2016) ("The SCC are suitable for intra-company transfers (e.g. for the transfer of
employee or vendor personal data between an EU company and its U.S. mother company) as well
as transfers between an EU company and its U.S.-based vendor (e.g. a data center)."). But this
standard contractual clause solution only works if the language appears in the relevant contract; it
may be necessary for a business to repaper multiple contracts to govern transfers between different
entities. See HOGAN LOVELLS, INTERNATIONAL DATA TRANSFERS: CONSIDERING YOUR OPTIONS 1
(2015), http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2015/10/HL-International-Data-Transfers-
Considering-your-options.pdf (advising that standard contractual clauses are "[s]uitable for one-
off transfers," but "[u]nworkable for multiple and evolving transfers").
72 See Overview on Binding Corporate Rules, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/intemational-transfers/binding-corporate-
rules/index.en.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2016).
73 Id.
74 STATEMENT OF THE ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, supra note 60, at 1.
75 Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
76 Id. Google also plans to build data centers in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, but has
supposedly avoided building one in China "due to the country's policies regarding content
filtering." Rich Miller, Google to Build Three Data Centers in Asia, DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Sept.
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because it ignores the threatening possibility that either set of regional authorities
will exercise extraterritoriality to gain access to the personal information. Both
the United States and the EU have expressed a willingness to use principles of
extraterritoriality to achieve their aims when companies or their data servers are
located outside their territory.
77
There is a possibility that these issues will be resolved in a second
bilateral agreement similar to the Safe Harbor. Tentatively titled the "Privacy
Shield," the bilateral agreement is supposed to resolve many of the issues raised
by the CJEU when it invalidated the original Safe Harbor.78 The Article 29
Working Party has promised to evaluate it for the four essential guarantees: (1)
"precise rules for processing," (2) government access "governed by the
principles of necessity and proportionality," (3) "independent oversight
mechanisms," and (4) "effective remedies open to individuals."79 The Working
Party will simultaneously re-evaluate the interim businesses solutions of model
contract clauses and business corporate rules against these same standards,8 °
which may also be found to offer insufficient data protection.
81
Some, like Director General John Higgins of DIGITALEUROPE (which
represents technology companies such as Apple Inc., Cisco Systems Inc., Google
Inc., and Microsoft Corp.), welcomed the announced agreement as a move that
would "re-establish a sustainable path for data transfers between the EU and
28, 2011), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2011/09/28/google-to-build-three-data-
centers-in-asia/.
77 See infra Part II.C and its discussion of the CJEU case, Weltimmo v. Nemzetti, 2015 ECLI
639, and the U.S. case, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled &
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), reversed and remanded sub
nom. Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
78 David Meyer, Looks Like Data Will Keep Flowing From the EU to the U.S. After All,
FORTUNE (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:19 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/02/looks-like-data-will-keep-
flowing-from-the-eu-to-the-u-s-after-all/.
79 Gardner, supra note 11.
80 Id. ("The Art. 29 Working Party had been due to publish the results of an analysis of the
impact of the ECJ's ruling on BCRs and SCCs, which might be vulnerable on similar grounds to
Safe Harbor. However, the analysis of BCRs and SCCs would be deferred until the Art. 29
Working Party could properly assess the proposed Privacy Shield arrangement, which would likely
be done by the end of March.").
81 Id. ("Although the court ruling was specific to Safe Harbor, it brought BCRs and SCCs into
question on the same grounds of government access to data and lack of redress."); Sam Pfeifle,
Privacy Shield Faces Skepticism in the Marketplace, But Standard Contractual Clauses Pose the
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US. 82 But there were others much more critical of the prospective agreement.83
German lawmaker Jan Philipp Albrecht, for instance, criticized the deal as "little
more than a reheated serving" of the Safe Harbor and called it "a joke. 84 Mr.
Albrecht is influential because he helped steer the new EU General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR") through the European Parliament.85 The GDPR
is a significant update to the EU data protection framework that has already been
approved but gives businesses two years to become compliant before it becomes
active law in 201 8.86 Albrecht criticized the provision prohibiting mass
surveillance by the American government as "vague," the creation of an
ombudsman to accept European complaints as insufficient, and stated that the
proposal is unlikely to withstand CJEU scrutiny.
87
The Privacy Shield agreement was technically adopted by the European
Commission on July 12, 2016.8 But, it was approved despite the European Data
Protection Supervisor advising that "progress compared to the earlier Safe
Harbo[]r Decision is not in itself sufficient" and that the "Privacy Shield as it
stands is not robust enough to withstand future legal scrutiny before the Court.
89
The Article 29 Working Party expressed similar concerns but agreed not to
82 Stephen Gardner, Safe Harbor Resurrected as EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, BNA BLOOMBERG
PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L. REP. (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Gardner, Safe Harbor Resurrected],
http://www.bna.com/safe-harbor-resurrected-n57982066887/.
83 See, e.g., David Gilbert, Safe Harbor 2.0: Max Schrems Calls 'Privacy Shield' National
Security Loopholes 'Lipstick On A Pig', INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016, 1:30 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/safe-harbor-20-max-schrems-calls-privacy-shield-national-security-
loopholes-lipstick-2327277; Jeff Stone, Safe Harbor 2.0: Critics Slam US EU 'Privacy Shield'
Data Transfer Deal's Lack Of Details, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016, 12:17 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/safe-harbor-20-critics-slam-us-eu-privacy-shield-data-transfer-deals-
lack-details-2292287.
84 Gardner, Safe Harbor Resurrected, supra note 82.
85 Id.
86 JAN PHILIPP ALBRECHT, EUR. PARLIAMENT LIBE COMMITTEE, EU GENERAL DATA
PROTECTION REGULATION STATE OF PLAY AND 10 IMPORTANT ISSUES 1 (2015),
https ://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Data protection-state-of_-play 10-iss
ues_061115.pdf.
87 Id.
88 The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/intemational-transfers/eu-us-privacy-shield/index-enhtm (last updated Oct. 13, 2016).
89 EMMA L. FLETT & SHANNON K. YAVORSKY, WORLD DATA PROT. REPORT, MORE ARMOUR
REQUIRED BEFORE PUTTING DOWN OUR GUARD? EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR ISSUES
OPINION ON PRIVACY SHIELD 2 (2016),
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/World%20Data%2Protection%2 OReport%20(P
rivacy%20Shield %20Flett,%20Yavorsky)%2OJune%202016.pdf; see also Jamie Davies, EU
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challenge its adequacy during the first year.90 Unfortunately, it could not prevent
third parties from filing such legal challenges: Digital Rights Ireland filed a
complaint against the agreement within two months of it coming into force.
9"
Because this bilateral agreement has yet to be approved by the CJEU, it cannot
yet be viewed as a viable long-term solution and does not mitigate the rationales
for regional harmonization.
C. The Threat of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The CJEU believes that member-state regulators have the authority to
enforce provisions of the EU Privacy Directive regardless of whether the relevant
company is physically located within their territories. It recently decided a case,
Weltimmo v. Nemzeti, in which the company facing enforcement action by the
member-state regulator was located outside the member-state but offered a
service to individuals within its borders.92 The company argued that the regulator
did not have authority to enforce the EU Privacy Directive provisions because
the business could only be held liable by the regulator of the member-state in
which it has its headquarters.93 But the CJEU disagreed.94 It instead held that
member-states could enforce provisions of the EU Privacy Directive against
companies outside the member-state in which they are "registered, in so far as
that controller exercises, through stable arrangements in the territory of that
Member State, a real and effective activity-even a minimal one-in the context
of which that processing is carried out."95
The greatest danger, however, may be hidden in an otherwise mundane
procedural case within the United States titled In re Warrant to Search a Certain
90 Stephen Gardner, EU Privacy Regulators Set Moratorium on Challenges to Data Transfer
Pact, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 26, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/eu-privacy-regulators-set-
moratorium-on-challenges-to-data-transfer-pact/.
91 Julie Fioretti & Dustin Volz, Privacy Group Launches Legal Challenge Against EU-U.S.
Data Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
dataprotection-usa-idUSKCN 12Q2JK.






95 Id.; see also Natasha Lomas, Europe's Top Court Strikes Down 'Safe Harbor' Data-
Transfer Agreement With U.S., TE CRUNCH NETWORK (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/europes-top-court-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-
agreement-with-u-s/ ("The Weltimmo ruling effectively means that ifa company operates a service
in a country it can be held accountable by that country's national data protection agency-despite
not being headquartered there.").
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E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp. ,96 which raises
the possibility that the United States will exercise extraterritorial authority over
data held on an overseas server within the territory of an EU member-state. The
warrant being debated was issued under the Stored Communications Act
("SCA") of the U.S. federal law Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA").97 Microsoft contends that the warrant should have been obtained
through the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty rather than being issued under a
domestic law.98 Whereas the United States contends that the "emails should be
treated as the business records of the company hosting them, by which definition
only a search warrant would be needed in order to compel the provision of access
to them no matter where they are stored."99 The danger, as Daniel Solove aptly
points out, is that other countries may reciprocate by using their own domestic
statutes to obtain data housed within the United States.'00 The result would be a
dangerous precedent permitting "governments around the world to seize
information held in the cloud."''
More importantly, execution of this warrant would eliminate dedicated
EU-based data centers as a viable interim solution. Up until now, transnational
businesses and the EU alike assumed that the ability of the U.S. government to
obtain data would be curtailed if the data was housed on a server outside U.S.
territory. But this will no longer be true if the warrant is executed and Microsoft
loses its appeal. As of the date of this writing, the warrant was upheld by the
court, Microsoft was seeking to appeal, and the U.S. government won a
revocation of a stay of the warrant's execution pending appeal.
0 2
96 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), reversed and remanded sub nom., Matter of Warrant
to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197
(2d Cir. 2016).
97 Daniel Solove, Should the U.S. Play by Different Rules in Cyberspace?, LINKEDIN (Sept.
24, 2015) [hereinafter Solove, Should the U.S. Play by Different Rules?],
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/should-us-play-different-rules-cyberspace-danie-solove. The
ECPA has three titles, one of which is the Stored Communications Act. Federal Statutes: ECPA,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS,
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (last revised July 30, 2013).
98 Solove, Should the U.S. Play by Different Rules?, supra note 97.
99 Sam Thielman, Microsoft Case: DoJ Says It Can Demand Every Email from Any US-Based
Provider, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:06 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-hotmail-ireland-
search-warrant.
100 Solove, Should the U.S. Play by Different Rules?, supra note 97.
101 Thielman, supra note 99.
102 See In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., Nos. M9-150, 13-MJ-2814, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014)
(granting government's motion to lift a stay on the warrant's execution); In re Warrant to Search
a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (permitting execution of the warrant), reversed and remanded sub nom. Matter
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III. ANALYSIS: REGIONAL HARMONIZATION iS Now A FEASIBLE, LONG-
TERM SOLUTION
Although regional harmonization of U.S. and EU data privacy was
historically considered impossible because of how committed each region was
to its individual frameworks,1" 3 it is now a much more feasible solution for four
reasons. First, the lack of a Safe Harbor permitting trans-Atlantic data transfers
between the frameworks creates an incentive to harmonize that did not
previously exist.104 This is particularly true when one considers the practical
business impact of being compliant with two distinct frameworks, which creates
a cumbersome duplication of processes for any business with trans-Atlantic data
operations, against the cost-saving benefits of complying with a streamlined set
of harmonized regulations established via bilateral agreement. Second, public
opinion regarding data privacy is changing in the United States, indicative of a
willingness to change its framework.105 There is a significant push for a more
meaningful and nuanced form of consent than the current "notice and consent"
or "privacy self-management" framework presents.10 6 This is evident in the class
action lawsuit against Google for its practice of data-mining all Gmail content
and the numerous proposals on how to update U.S. law for the age of big data.1
0 7
Third, there are shared economic and security imperatives that may make the call
of Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
103 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 881 ("Attempts to harmonize U.S. and EU privacy
law by turning EU privacy law into a U.S.-style approach, or vice versa, are unlikely to succeed.
Both the United States and European Union are deeply committed to their respective approaches.").
104 See discussion infra Part III.A.
105 See discussion infra Part III.B.
106 See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
107 See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3. The term "big data" refers to the collection and
analysis of large, complex data sets. Dennis D. Hirsch, That's Unfair! Or is it? Big Data,
Discrimination and the FTC's Authority, 103 KY. L. J. 345, 349 (2014). A full discussion of "big
data" and its scope, including its uses and accompanying risks, is outside the scope of this Note.
But it is important to understand the concept on a general level because it directly impacts why
data transfers are important and why they are being regulated. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone
Noveck eds., 2004) ("There are hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic databases of
psychological profiles, amassing data about an individual's race, gender, income, hobbies, and
purchases. Shards of data from our daily existence are now being assembled and analyzed-to
investigate backgrounds, check credit, market products, and make a wide variety of decisions
affecting our lives."). See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WiLL TRANSFORM How WE LIvE, WORK, AND THINK (2013)
(discussing the positive and negative ways in which big data affects us and changes the way in
which we live, work, and think). Data-mining is the process in which companies analyze raw data
to produce useful information, such as learning more about their customers or developing effective
marketing strategies. Data Mining, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/datamining.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
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for regional harmonization a far more feasible solution than it was historically
regarded.10 8 Finally, regional harmonization does not require that the United
States and EU have frameworks that mirror each other exactly.10 9
A. The Lack of a Safe Harbor Encourages Regional
Harmonization
One reason why previous proposals for regional harmonization may
have been considered unfeasible is because it was not a business necessity.
Trans-Atlantic data transfers were already permissible under the Safe Harbor
framework,1 0 which did not require the United States overhaul or even revise its
legal framework."' Companies interested in conducting trans-Atlantic data
transfers only needed to self-certify that they would provide a level of privacy
equivalent to that of the EU framework despite having lower legal requirements
in the United States.1 2 Thus, harmonization was unnecessary.
But the CJEU's invalidation of the Safe Harbor creates an incentive for
regional harmonization that did not previously exist, and was in significant part
based on the very fact that the United States did not adjust its legal framework to
ensure an equivalent level of data protection. 113 Even if the participating
companies delivered all the protections they promised in their self-certification,
and these promised protections were found to be equivalent to EU protections (a
question of fact that the CJEU did not consider in Schrems v. Facebook), the U.S.
government was not bound by the Safe Harbor and could access EU data that
was otherwise protected by self-certified Safe Harbor participants via
contradictory federal laws.' 14 This is precisely why the tentative Privacy Shield
agreement, which is designed to replace the Safe Harbor but has yet to receive
approval from the Article 29 Working Party or the 28 EU member states,115 is
said to only be viable if it meets four "essential guarantees": (1) "precise rules
for processing," (2) government access "governed by the principles of necessity
and proportionality," (3) "independent oversight mechanisms," and (4)
"effective remedies open to individuals."'1 16
108 See discussion infra Part III.C.
109 See discussion infra Part III.D.
110 See discussion supra Part II.B. 1
II See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
112 Bhatti, supra note 14.
113 See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
114 See discussion supra note 31 and accompanying text.
115 Sheila A. Millar et al., Safe Harbor 2.0 Arrives as EU-U.S. Privacy Shield; Approvals Still
Necessary, NAT'L L. REV. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/safe-harbor-20-
arrives-eu-us-privacy-shield-approvals-still-necessary.
116 Gardner, supra note 11.
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The demand that these EU privacy standards are met before any bilateral
agreement is finalized means the EU will not abandon or water-down those
principles to do business with the United States. But transnational business
transactions are commonplace in today's globalized digital economy, and many
U.S. businesses rely heavily on the 15-year-old Safe Harbor framework when
conducting their business and establishing their infrastructure.1 17 Both are
endangered by the inability to reconcile the regional frameworks, thereby
creating a strong incentive to harmonize the regional frameworks that did not
exist before the Safe Harbor was invalidated.
Regional harmonization offers the additional benefit of potentially
streamlining the regulations a business may need to follow to conduct compliant
trans-Atlantic data transfers. Right now, companies need to abide by both the EU
and the U.S. data privacy frameworks. Those frameworks, as discussed above in
Part II.A, are fundamentally different. The United States, for example, permits
data processing unless it is specifically limited by law, whereas the EU prohibits
it unless it is expressly permitted by law.1 18 EU citizens cannot contract their
privacy rights away in end user agreements, whereas U.S. citizens can.119 This
creates a cumbersome duplication of processes for any business that offers
services to both, as the business must be compliant with the stricter, broader EU
rules while also abiding by U.S. law. This means businesses with trans-Atlantic
data operations are creating and maintaining two different end user agreements,
two different sets of procedures for storing and managing customer data, and two
different processes for splicing and analyzing such data. Regional harmonization
might eliminate some of that duplicative effort, streamline business
requirements, and perhaps even identify a set of common standards or principles
that better serve both regions.
B. U.S. Opinion Demonstrates Interest in Change
Another reason why proposals to harmonize the two regional data
privacy frameworks may have historically failed is that there was little interest
in change in the United States. But U.S. public opinion regarding data privacy is
now changing, indicating a willingness to change its framework. This change is
evident in three ways. One, there is a growing recognition that the notice and
consent system is flawed, and a significant push for a more meaningful and
nuanced form of consent than the current notice and consent or "privacy self-
management" framework presents.120 Two, the growing dissatisfaction with the
current Framework is evident in the class action lawsuit brought against Google
for its practice of data-mining all Gmail content. Three, there are numerous
117 See Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
118 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
120 See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
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proposals on how to update U.S. law for the age of big data.12 Each of these
indicators demonstrates a growing interest in changing the current U.S. data
privacy framework; making regional harmonization much more feasible than it
was historically regarded.
1. Growing Recognition that the Notice and Consent System is
Flawed
The U.S. public is becoming increasingly interested in changing data
privacy within the United States. More of the public believes that the notice and
consent system is not effective, and there has been a recent push for more
meaningful forms of consent.'22 The term "privacy self-management" was
coined by Professor Daniel J. Solove to represent the idea that individuals can
consent to the "collection, use, or disclosure" of their personal data.1 23 Under this
type of framework, individuals are given a bundle of certain legal rights such as
"rights to notice, access, and consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure
of personal data" that the individual can then choose to exercise after "weigh[ing]
the costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information."'
' 24
That may sound great in theory, but Solove also identified some key
cognitive and structural flaws within privacy self-management hat prevent it
from providing individuals with meaningful control over their data.125 These
hurdles include:
(1) People do not read privacy policies; (2) if people read them,
they do not understand them; (3) if people read and understand
them, they often lack enough background knowledge to make an
informed choice; and (4) if people read them, understand them,
and can make an informed choice, their choice might be skewed
by various decision[-]making difficulties.
126
These challenges are compounded by the structural difficulties embedded in the
current system, such as the fact that people are asked to make decisions at the
point of collection, but the "true consequences of information use for individuals
cannot be known when they make these decisions. Furthermore, the
121 See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
122 See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
123 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARv. L. REv.
1879, 1880 (2013).
124 Id. at 1880.
125 Id. at 1880-81.
126 Id. at 1888.
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consequences are cumulative, and they cannot be adequately assessed in a series
of isolated transactions."127
But at least privacy self-management recognizes that data is not
"inherently good or bad," but dependent on the context of the data use.' There
are many societal benefits that such data collection and use can offer, including
the ability to track flu trends in live time and conduct medical research.,29 In
2009, for instance, Google was able to predict the spread of the HINI virus in
the United States, "not just nationally, but down to specific regions and even
states."130 They did this by identifying a correlation between official Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") figures and a mathematical model they
combined with 45 search terms.131 It was a significant achievement: "Like the
CDC, they could tell where the flu had spread, but unlike the CDC they could
tell it in near real time, not a week or two after the fact."1 32 Healthcare researchers
at Kaiser Permanente were able to similarly use the medical records of 3.2
million individuals to determine that a child's risk of autism doubled if the
mother used antidepressants during her pregnancy. 133 The researchers only made
the link because they had access to a large number of medical records that were
retained after being collected for some other purpose; they "almost certainly
[would] not have made the discovery if they had... conduct[ed] only a smaller,
'opt-in' study that required people to actively consent to providing the particular
information the researchers were looking for."'
' 34
The issue is not that individuals are not interested in contributing to such
beneficial projects, it is that they wish to provide a more nuanced form of consent
regarding how their data may be used.135 For instance, many may be willing to
donate their data to medical researchers dedicated to curing cancer or otherwise
conducting broad medical research beneficial to society as a whole, but they
would simultaneously wish to prohibit that data from ever being accessible by
insurance companies interested in health-based premium rate adjustments.
Others may be comfortable with in-app targeted advertising (such as
127 Id. at 1893.
128 Id. at 1898.
129 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 107, at 1-2 (noting that Google can track the
HINI virus in live time); Craig Mundie, Privacy Pragmatism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (March/April
2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-02-12/privacy-pragmatism ("[11n 2011,
researchers at the health-care giant Kaiser Permanente used the medical records of 3.2 million
individuals to find a link between autism spectrum disorders in children and their mothers' use of
antidepressant drugs.").
130 See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 107, at 2.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Mundie, supra note 129.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., id.
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personalized advertising within a user's email service) but not with that data
being directly sold or otherwise shared with those advertisers or other third
parties. In that case, the individual wishes to decide whether or not to purchase
the product or express further interest by signing up for the company newsletter
or exploring the website himself. He does not want to end up on a mailing list
because his email provider identified interest in a product during in-app targeted
advertising and then sold that potential interest to that third party, without any
action on his part. The current notice and consent and privacy self-management
framework within the United States does not allow for such a nuanced form of
consent.
Although the current form of privacy self-management is imperfect, it
nevertheless forms an important part of the foundation of most data privacy
frameworks.136 The below case study regarding Google's data-mining of Gmail
content provides a practical example of how the privacy self-management or
notice and consent framework is flawed, and how U.S. public opinion regarding
data privacy is changing.
2. The Class Action Lawsuit Against Google's Data-Mining of
All Gmail Content
The U.S. public's growing dissatisfaction with the current data privacy
framework is evident in the class action lawsuit against Google for its data-
mining of all Gmail content. When Google announced that its new terms of
service permit it to mine the content of all emails within its system, the public
was outraged.137 The company's terms state it is entitled to open, read, and retain
the content of any emails sent from-or delivered to-a Gmail user.38 This
includes emails delivered from non-Gmail users who never agreed to its terms of
service, and may have actually rejected those terms by choosing to use a different
email service.1 39 Numerous lawsuits have been filed against the company,
particularly in California, alleging that the practice violates California privacy
laws and federal wiretapping statutes. 140 In one class action lawsuit, filed on
behalf of all those non-Gmail users who send email messages to Gmail users, the
136 See supra Part II.A.2, which includes a discussion of how the United States and EU handle
consent differently by establishing different limits on contractual freedom.
137 Martha Mendoza, Google Pleads Its Case For Scanning Your Emails to Help Sell Ads,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 2013, 4:39 AM) [hereinafter Google Pleads],
https://web.archive.org/web/20130908164440/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/gmail-
ads-email-scanning-n_3871246.html; see also Martha Mendoza, Google Argues for Rights to
Continue Scanning Email, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:46 PM) [hereinafter Google Argues],
http://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2013/09/05/google-argues-for-right-to-
continue-scanning-gmail.
138 Google Pleads, supra note 137; Google Argues, supra note 137.
139 Google Pleads, supra note 137; Google Argues, supra note 137.
140 Google Pleads, supra note 137; Google Argues, supra note 137.
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practice was described as the "twenty-first-century equivalent of AT&T
eavesdropping on each of its customers' phone conversations, or of the postal
service taking information from private correspondence-acts that uniformly
would be condemned as egregious and illegal invasions of privacy under any
circumstance." 
14 1
Google argues that the data-mining is necessary because it generates
revenue from an otherwise free email service through improved targeted
advertising.1 42 But opponents argue that the company's actions invade its users'
privacy and takes their "property because they can get it for free as opposed to
paying for it.' '143 It is certainly true that there is a commonly held philosophy in
the United States that private data can be treated as a commodity when an
individual cedes his or her privacy in exchange for an otherwise free, tailored, or
convenient service. 44 But it is certainly not true that data-mining and targeted
advertising are the only mechanisms through which Google can generate revenue
from its email service. In fact, the public outrage over the practice is a persuasive
indicator that users would rather pay an annual membership for the email service
than have the contents and associated metadata of that correspondence "scanned,
analyzed, and catalogued indefinitely."
1 45
The practice of data-mining and targeted advertising is partially based
on the premise that an individual's personal data is more valuable when
combined with the personal data of others within a similar age group or
characteristic because it can reveal larger trends (of which even the individuals
themselves may be unaware) that will generate more revenue when sold (either
outright or via advertising services) to a third party business than the company
may be able to generate through individual membership subscriptions. But this
makes it incredibly profitable-and indeed preferable-for companies to coerce
141 Kat Greene, Google Faces New Privacy Class Claims Over Email Scanning, LAw360,
(Sept. 8, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/699961/google-faces-new-privacy-
class-claims-over-email-scanning (quoting Plaintiffs complaint).
142 See id.; Heather Kelly, Why Gmail and Other E-mail Services Aren't Really Free, CNN
(April 1, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/tech/web/gmail-privacy-problems/;
Google Argues, supra note 137.
143 Google Argues, supra note 137.
144 Julia Angwin, Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/opinion/has-privacy-become-a-luxury-good.html?_r-0 ("In
our data-saturated economy, privacy is becoming a luxury good. After all, as the saying goes, if
you aren't paying for the product, you are the product. And currently, we aren't paying for very
much of our technology.").
145 Greene, supra note 141. Indeed, the idea that people are "willing to pay a modest upfront
price to join social networks that guarantee the integrity of their personal data" has produced the
concept of the "privacy economy." DJ Pangburn, How App Companies are Turning Privacy into
a Commodity, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 10, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/how-
app-companies-are-turning-privacy-into-a-commodity. It is supported by a recent study by several
economists at the University of Colorado-Boulder that found that "people would pay $5.06 for the
sweet nectar of privacy." Id.
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users into ceding their private, personal data to use a service rather than pay for
it outright. Indeed, businesses are now "conditioning products, services, or
access on opting in" and it is now common for "agreeing to ... end-user license
agreements ... [to be] a prerequisite for obtaining access to a website or to use
a product or service.14 6 The user has no bargaining power.47 The U.S. public is
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with this status quo and there is a significant
push for a more nuanced form of consent than the current privacy self-
management framework presents, as evidenced by the above class action lawsuit
against Google's data-mining of all its Gmail content and the numerous
proposals for updating U.S. law that are discussed below.
3. There Are Numerous Proposals for Updating U.S. Law
Historical proposals for regional harmonization may have been
discarded because of insufficient U.S. interest in changing existing data privacy
protections, but discontent is often identified through proposals for change. In
this case, the sheer volume and scope of the proposals for updating data privacy
law in the United States indicate the level of change in U.S. public opinion. As
the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology ("PCAST")
effectively stated in its 2014 presidential report, "new collisions between
technologies and privacy have become evident, as new technological capabilities
have emerged at a rapid pace. It is no longer clear that. .. [the current data
privacy framework is] sufficient in the court of public opinion. '1 48 The
recommendations for changing this insufficient framework include creating a
more meaningful form of consent in an improved privacy self-management
framework, using metadata "wrappers" to regulate data use rather than data
collection, and establishing clear due process requirements for digital transaction
surveillance. Each of these proposals indicates that the U.S. public is interested
in changing its data privacy framework and it is this desire for change that makes
regional harmonization a more feasible long-term solution than it was
historically regarded.
i. Improve Privacy Self-Management
One way those dissatisfied with the current U.S. data privacy framework
recommend changing it is to improve privacy self-management so it provides a
more meaningful form of consent. The limitations of privacy self-management
are apparent to any mobile device user that has accepted an end user agreement
146 Solove, supra note 123, at 1898.
147 Id.
148 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE
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in the past. As PCAST summarized in its 2014 presidential report, "[i]n some
fantasy world, users actually read these notices, understand their legal
implications (consulting their attorneys if necessary), negotiate with other
providers of similar services to get better privacy treatment, and only then click
to indicate their consent. Reality is different."149 In reality, people do not read
privacy policies. 150 Even if they did, Solove points out that they do not know
enough to understand them or make an informed choice.1 51 Moreover, it is
impossible to exercise meaningful control in such a manner (even if one did read
and understand every privacy policy) because the very benefit big data provides
in creating "new, non-obvious, unexpectedly powerful uses of data" defeats
notice and consent as an effective policy tool: "[i]t is simply too complicated for
the individual to make fine-grained choices for every new situation or app.' 52
Solove proposed resolving these difficulties by "recognizing that people
can engage in privacy self-management only selectively," "adjusting privacy
law's timing to focus on downstream uses," and "developing a coherent approach
to consent ... that accounts for the social science discoveries about how people
make decisions about personal data."1 53 But PCAST provided an even more
concrete solution. It proposed that a third party or agency be created that would
be responsible for vetting apps and other digital services against user privacy
preferences.54 Thus, users could create a privacy profile that provides a more
nuanced form of consent and the agency would be responsible for comparing
those preferences against each company's privacy notice to advise whether or
not they align.155 This would create a "marketplace for the negotiation of
community standards of privacy" and encourage businesses to close any gaps
between user preferences and current practices.
156
ii. Regulate Data Use Rather than Data Collection
Another proposed means of improving the current U.S. data privacy
framework is to change the focus of regulation from data collection to data use.
Craig Mundie discusses this proposal at length in his Foreign Affairs article,
Privacy Pragmatism, and the PCAST cited and adopted his work in its
presidential report.1 57 Just as Solove suggested in his critique of privacy self-
149 Id. at 38.
150 Solove, supra note 123, at 1888.
151 Id.
152 PCAST PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 148, at 38.
153 Solove, supra note 123, at 1903.
154 PCAST PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 148, at 40-41.
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management that "people can engage in privacy self-management only
selectively,,158 Mundie suggests that "there is simply so much data being
collected, in so many ways, that it is practically impossible to give people a
meaningful way to keep track of all the information about them that exists out
there, much less to consent to its collection in the first place."'159 The solution is
to shift the regulatory focus from the point of collection to the point of use.
160
Mundie suggests that the fears users experience regarding privacy
violations are not based on the actual data collection, but the fact that "people do
not know who possesses data related to them and have no way to know whether
the information is being used in acceptable ways."1 61 After all, the simple fact
that the data is available does not mean it has been abused (yet).1 62 But the
practice of providing consent at the point of collection (by clicking yes to an
endless number of end user agreements) is worthless because those agreements
never give sufficient specifics about how that collected data will be used.163 And
if the agreement permits the data being sold to third parties, then that original
notice and consent does nothing to limit the downstream uses of that data. In the
end, Mundie points out:
When people are asked to give a practical example of how their
privacy might be violated, they rarely talk about the information
that is being collected. Instead, they talk about what might be
done with that information, and the consequences: identity theft
or impersonation, personal embarrassment, or companies
making uncomfortable and unwelcome inferences about their
preferences or behavior. When it comes to privacy, the data
rarely matters, but the use always does.1 6
4
To be effective, data privacy regulation must shift from requiring consent at the
point of data collection to creating a consent framework around data use.
One mechanism for accomplishing this, according to Mundie, is creating
data "wrappers" that describe the type of material it contained without revealing
content.165 These wrappers would be created at the moment the data is created
and contain rules around how and when that data can be accessed and used,
essentially acting as a virtual "lock" against unauthorized use.166 Thus, anyone
158 Solove, supra note 123, at 1903.
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seeking to unlock the wrapper would need to get approval from the requisite
authorities167 and perhaps be subject to compliance audits by data regulators.168
Mundie compares these "wrappers" to the encryption the entertainment industry
added to reduce video piracy and maintains that these digital rights management
systems would only need to be revised slightly to accommodate such an
application to data.169 Because such a system would require significant details
about the types of uses and processing that users would be willing to agree to,
and must necessarily and constantly evolve with the technology industry,
Mundie suggests that users delegate these rights to a newly created agency that
would be responsible for establishing and enforcing such standards on a large
scale. 170
When PCAST incorporated Mundie's proposal into its presidential
report on big data and privacy, it suggested that individuals should be able to
create a personal privacy profile with nuanced instructions regarding how their
data can be used after collection.1 71 These instructions would then be translated
into code, rendered tamper-proof, and attached to all data associated with that
person.172 The code must be "sticky" so that it remains even if the data is copied
or moved.173 According to PCAST, such use-driven management systems
already exist within the U.S. intelligence community and are being increasingly
implemented as part of custom builds for large commercial companies, so it is
likely that the government could "help motivate the creation of an off-the-shelf
standard software.174
iii. Establish Clear Due Process Requirements for Digital
Transaction Surveillance
A third proposal for improving the current U.S. data privacy
framework-and the final one that will be discussed in this Note as evidence of
how changing U.S. opinion makes regional harmonization much more feasible
than it was historically considered-is to clarify and establish clear due process
requirements for digital transaction surveillance. There are numerous types of





171 PCAST Presidential Report, supra note 148, at 41.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 42.
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pursue in today's big data environment.175 Of those, transaction surveillance is
the act of "accessing already-existing records, either physically or through
computer databanks.... [and] accessing, in real-time or otherwise, the
identifying signals of a transaction (such as the address of an email recipient).' 76
This is in addition to the more traditional forms of real-time physical and
communications surveillance that authorities could use in conjunction.
177
But unlike the more traditional forms of surveillance, for which there is
a fair amount of jurisprudence regarding the relevant due process requirements
for surveillance activity (e.g. needing a warrant based on probable cause issued
by an independent judge),178 there is a great deal of confusion regarding the
certainty level and authorization required for these more modem forms of
transactional surveillance.179 Professor Christopher Slobogin consolidated the
various authorization levels currently required for transactional surveillance in a
table that is reproduced in full below.
175 See Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MIss. L.J. 139,
139-41 (2005).
176 Id. at 140.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 152-54.
179 Id. at 166.
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Table 1: Current Law of Transaction Surveillance 
80
Transaction Auth'zation Certainty Level
Req'd
Warrant Probable cause
Terry Order Reasonable suspicion
Medical, financial & tax Subpoena Relevance, challengeable by
records; stored email target
Financial records and Delayed-notice Relevance, challengeable by
stored email if notification Subpoena target only after records
poses risks obtained
Billing records and logs of Ex Parte Relevance, challengeable
phone companies & ISPs; Subpoena only by third party record-
most customer records holder
Interception of catalogic Certification Relevance (determined by
information re calls & Order government), issued by court,
email; tangible items re challengeable only by third
terrorism party record-holder
Federal public records; Extrajudicial Relevance (determined by
financial records re Certification government), not
terrorism challengeable by any party
_______________________ _____________ (?)
State public records not None None
protected by law or that are
acquired by a CDB I
The sheer volume and variety of authorization levels and due process
requirements causes confusion. Professor Slobogin suggested eliminating this
confusion by streamlining all the current authorizations levels into three: a
warrant, Terry Order, or subpoena.181 Should the United States implement this
proposal to clarify existing law by establishing clear due process requirements
for digital transaction surveillance, it will have alleviated significant EU
concerns surrounding trans-Atlantic data transfers82 and potentially contributed
to the identification of common due process principles that could serve as part of
a future bilateral agreement for regional harmonization.
180 Id. at 166-67.
181 Id. at 169.
182 Namely, limited government access per the principle of necessity and proportionality, as
discussed in notes 11, 56, and their accompanying text.
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C. Shared Economic and Security Imperatives Encourage
Regional Harmonization
Regional harmonization is a much more feasible, long-term solution than
it was historically regarded because, in addition to the various proposals
discussed above that indicate significant U.S. interest in changing the prevailing
framework, the United States and the EU share economic and security
imperatives that drive harmonization.
First, regional harmonization is economically imperative to both regions.
The EU and the United States are two of the world's largest economies183
(representing 75% of all products traded and delivered online)114 and they are
each other's largest trading partner in digitally deliverable services.185 The
inability to find sufficient regional harmony to permit trans-Atlantic data
transfers endangers billions of dollars of trade1 6 and over 4,500 U.S.
companies. 187 Nearly all multinational businesses move customer and employee
data between regions, including General Electric and Pfizer. 188 And this does not
take into account the non-U.S. businesses that may be impacted because of data
processing or storage subcontract agreements with U.S. companies that rely on
trans-Atlantic data transfers.1 89 Regional harmonization would preserve the
existing economic activity and encourage increased activity within the trans-
183 Mark Scott, Europe's Top Digital-Privacy Watchdog Zeros in on U.S. Tech Giants, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2016), http://nytimes.com/2016/01/25/technology/europes-top-digital-privacy-
watchdog-zeros-in-on-us-tech-giants.html.
184 U.S. MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 15 ("And demonstrating the
interconnectedness of U.S. and European industries, 53 percent of digitally deliverable services
imported from the U.S. (including consulting, engineering, design, and financial services) were
used in the production of EU exports, and 62 percent of digitally deliverable services imported
from the EU were incorporated into U.S. exports.").
185 Id.
186 Scott, supra note 183.
187 Drozdiak & Schechner, supra note 11.
188 Scott, supra note 183.
189 The Safe Harbor was commonly used for "data transfers needed to support intra-group
operations (for example to assist a U.S. parent in managing EU-based activities) and outsourced
services involving a U.S. cloud or software-as-a-service provider." DLA PIPER, US SAFE HARBOR
FRAMEWORK DECLARED INVALID 2 (2015),
https://www.dlapiper.com/-/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2015/1 0/Safe Harbor ClientFlie
r.pdf. Its invalidation affects "more than US tech companies," including any company that relied
on the Safe Harbor "as a legal basis for transferring user, customer, employee or any other personal
data to the United States, either intra-group or through the supply chain." Id. at 2. Thus, it is often
recommended that every company "verify whether [their] vendors process EU personal data in the
United States, or process EU personal data in the EU but have a contractually stipulated right to
relocate the data (e.g., in a cloud context)." Id. at 4. Should the vendor employ a subcontractor,




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/12
TRANS-A TLANTIC DATA REG ULA TION
Atlantic digital economy. Establishing common data protection principles that
could streamline the demanding and duplicative regulations to which many
multinational businesses are subject in the United States and the EU could
actually cut costs and encourage more trans-Atlantic trade.
Second, the United States and the EU share similarly imperative national
security interests in harmonizing their data privacy frameworks.190 Data mining
is becoming an increasingly important tool in anti-terrorism efforts,19' and
terrorism remains a critical and substantial threat to both regions. Europol
advises that the Islamic State has "expand[ed] its activities to a global level, with
a focus on the European Union" and that the EU should "prepare for more
frequent acts of terror similar to the recent Paris attacks."'92 This is particularly
troubling when 201 terrorist attacks were carried out in EU member-states during
2014 alone.193 According to one source, there were only 11 terrorist attacks
within the United States during 2014,194 but there were 91 homegrown and 380
international terrorist attacks in the United States between 2001 and 2009.195
United States counterterrorism efforts have evolved to include means for
accessing data on both national and foreign citizens. The 702 program,"96 for
190 The United States and the EU recognized this security interest when it created the Terror
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in 2010, which permits "bank and credit card transaction
information to the U.S. treasury in an effort to trace funding to terrorist groups." NSA Spy Scandal
May Scuttle EU-US Anti-Terrorist Agreement - EU Commissioner, RT.COM (Sept. 26, 2013),
https://www.rt.com/news/nsa-eu-snowden-terrorism-financial-321/. But the EU has threatened to
suspend this data-sharing deal after the Snowden leaks revealed that the NSA was "tapping into
the SWIFT databases to gain access to the private data of Europeans on their financial dealings"
and that officials relied on "broad administrative subpoenas for millions of records" rather than
seeking "individual court-approved warrants or subpoenas to examine specific transactions." Id.
191 BHAVANI THURAISINGHAM, DATA MINING FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM 191,
https://www.utdallas.edu/-jxr06l100/paper-for-website/%5B 18%5DMining-Terrorism-
NGDM04.pdf ("Data mining is becoming a useful tool for detecting and preventing Terrorism.").
Indeed, it is one reason why the FBI is so adamant about getting access to the encrypted data on
the iPhone of the terrorist who committed the attacks in San Bernardino, California. See discussion
supra Part I.
192 ISIS Focusing on EU, Threat of Imminent Terror Attack- Europol, RT.coM (Jan. 26, 2016),
https://www.rt.com/news/330151-isis-europe-terror-europol/.
193 EUROPOL, EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION & TREND REPORT 2015, at 8 (2015),
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-
2015.
194 Win. Robert Johnson, Terrorist Attacks and Related Incidents in the United States,
JOHNSTON'S ARCHIVE, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorismI/wrjp255a.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
195 David B. Muhlhausen & Jena Baker McNeill, Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on
International and Domestic Terrorism, HERITAGE (May 20, 2011),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/terror-trends-40-years-data-on-intemational-
and-domestic-terrorism.
196 The 702 program is one of two intelligence collection programs used by the NSA,
authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. PRIVACY AND CIVIL
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instance, permits the U.S. government to "serve orders on social media, webmail,
and electronic service providers who store their global customers' data in the
United States."'1 97 The United States has even shared this intelligence with the
EU to prevent or solve terrorist attacks. Indeed, the United States shared large
amounts of intelligence with France after the Paris attacks and it even helped
Germany "thwart [several] planned suicide bombings in Munich over the New
Year holiday."'1 98 But the invalidation of the Safe Harbor threatens the source of
much of this information. The 702 program relies on accessing global data held
in the United States by multinational companies. Although the U.S. government
can still serve court orders on those companies and demand access to their data,
the results will no longer be the global data that assisted Germany in thwarting
the New Year holiday suicide bombings in Munich or helped France after the
Paris attacks. It will no longer include the EU data that was traditionally
incorporated via trans-Atlantic data transfers under the Safe Harbor framework.
Regional harmonization, however, could solve this issue. It is one more
reason why regional harmonization is a much more feasible, long-term solution
than it was historically regarded. It cannot be resolved without first discussing
differences between the regional frameworks, of course, and then discussing the
common principles that should govern government surveillance and the level of
due process required before such surveillance could be performed. These aspects
do differ across the regional frameworks; consider, for example, the complicated
U.S. due process requirements earlier critiqued by Slobogin and the essential
guarantee in the EU that "any government access to data should be governed by
the principles of necessity and proportionality."'1 99 But the very fact that there are
varying levels of due process on both sides of the Atlantic means that success is
just a matter of finding common ground. This may be difficult, but it is not
impossible; both regions have significant national security interests in ensuring
that their intelligence agencies are able to gather sufficient data that their
counterterrorism efforts are effective. The regions share similar economic
incentives to harmonize their data privacy frameworks, as doing so will preserve
billions of dollars in trans-Atlantic trade and encourage further economic growth.
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014),
http://www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PCLOB-Section-702-Report-PRE-
RELEASE.pdf. It permits the U.S. government to collect "the contents of electronic
communications, including telephone calls and emails, where the target is reasonably believed to
be a non-U.S. person located outside the United States." Id. at 1.
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D. Harmonization Does Not Require Mirror Image Frameworks
Regional harmonization may have been historically discarded as
unlikely to succeed because it was difficult to imagine how to bridge the
significant gaps between the regional frameworks without requiring one region
to adopt a mirror image of the other's framework. As two highly respected legal
privacy scholars, Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, theorized, "[a]ttempts
to harmonize U.S. and EU privacy law by turning EU privacy law into a U.S.-
style approach, or vice versa, are unlikely to succeed. Both the United States and
EU are deeply committed to their respective approaches.2 °°
But regional harmonization amongst the United States and the EU does
not require that either region abandon its framework and adopt mirror images of
the other's to be successful. Consider the harmony involved in a musical piece;
envision a piano chord. Each note within that chord represents a particular key
without which the chord itself could not exist.2 °1 In this case, the United States
and the EU are represented by two separate and distinct notes that create a
discordant sound when played together. The idea of regional harmonization is
that one can find a single point at which the two regional frameworks agree,
perhaps by identifying some key principles that are met in both frameworks, and
that third note of commonality can create a chord that is much more pleasing to
the ear. The resulting harmony does not require mirror images of a particular
framework, so much as an agreement among the regions as to a common set of
principles that both regional frameworks would honor.
So long as the United States and EU could agree on a core set of common
principles, it remains possible for the regions to maintain their distinct
frameworks and enforcement mechanisms while still creating trans-Atlantic
harmony in data privacy regulation.202 This Note does not presume to propose
what those common principles should be, as that is a topic whose analysis best
deserves a separate Note. But it does not make it impossible. The move would
200 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 23, at 881.
201 See Duane Shinn, Piano Chords: How Many Are There?, PLAYPIANO.COM,
http://www.playpiano.com/Articles/29-howmanychords.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) ("[A] 3
note chord has 3 positions.").
202 Consider the fact that the EU data privacy framework is actually based on "the Fair
Information Practice Principles, which were initially developed in the U.S. in the 1960s and
1970s.... Even the EU regulatory structure, which requires an independent regulatory agency,
was borrowed from the United States." Abraham Newman, After Safe Harbor: Bridging the EU-
U.S. Data-Privacy Divide, WORLD POL. REv. (Feb. 9, 2016),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/17898/after-safe-harbor-bridging-the-eu-u-s-data-
privacy-divide. The U.S. and EU data privacy frameworks may differ significantly, as discussed
in Part ILA, but the very fact the EU framework was inspired by U.S. practices means that it is
likely that the regional frameworks are supported by a common set of principles. These common
principles merely need to be identified and expanded upon to create a new bilateral agreement
whose procedures and principles could then govern future trans-Atlantic data transfers.
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require significant negotiation and buy-in by political parties and businesses, but
it could provide a stronger, long-term solution if carefully crafted. Indeed, the
final agreement could take the form of a treaty and might even be nicknamed the
new "Safe Harbor 2.0," permitting trans-Atlantic data transactions provided they
meet the common principles included in the agreement and are guaranteed to be
enforced by the relevant domestic enforcement authority in each region.
IV. CONCLUSION
To sustain trans-Atlantic data transfers in the long-term, the United
States and the EU must harmonize their data privacy frameworks. Right now, the
sharp differences between the regional frameworks produce a level of discord
similar to the grating sounds of a musical performance without harmony. This
striking discord between the United States and the EU was formerly mitigated
by the Safe Harbor framework, but its recent demise made the regional discord
worse by removing that single harmonizing note.
Legal scholars have historically discarded proposals to harmonize U.S.
and EU data privacy regulation as impossible because of the large gap between
the frameworks and each region's deep commitment to their approach.2 °3 But
this Note demonstrates that the idea of regional harmonization is much more
feasible than it was in the past, and it should no longer be discarded as an inviable
option. As this Note argued, regional harmonization is now a much more feasible
long-term solution for four reasons: (1) the lack of a Safe Harbor permitting
trans-Atlantic data transfers creates an incentive that did not exist previously, (2)
the change in U.S. public opinion regarding data privacy demonstrates an interest
in changing its framework, (3) the regions share economic and security
imperatives for harmonization, and (4) the regions do not need mirror image
frameworks to achieve harmonization.
What form that harmonization should take, and the common principles
that it should be comprised of, is the subject of another Note. But the idea of
harmonization is certainly much more feasible than it was historically regarded,
and it should no longer be discarded as an inviable option.
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to succeed .... [because] [b]oth the United States and European Union are deeply committed to
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